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This paper uses an error correction model to investigate empirically 
the effectiveness of central bank interest rate policy in influencing 
commercial banks’ lending rate behaviour in Barbados and the Bahamas 
using quarterly data for the period January 1995-April 2007. For Barbados, 
the study finds that the reaction of commercial bank lending rates to 
changes in the central bank’s policy rate is sticky in the short run, but 
fully complete in the long run. On average, it takes about four to six 
quarters for the full effect of changes in the central bank policy rate to 
be transmitted to the economy via adjustments. For the Bahamas, the 
reaction of commercial bank lending rates to changes in the central bank 
policy rate is fully complete in the short run and the long run, owing to a 
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Any government can use at the very least fiscal policy 
or monetary policy, or both, to impact the country’s 
macroeconomic aggregates such as the inflation rate, 
unemployment and economic growth. While government 
taxes and government expenditures are the main tools 
of fiscal policy, interest rates and the money supply are 
the key instruments of monetary policy. The choice of 
one policy over another or the policy mix depends on 
the characteristics of the country under consideration, 
i.e. its exchange rate regime, level of development and 
size of its economy. 
This paper addresses the issue of interest rate pass-
through in the context of two small open economies with 
fixed exchange rate regimes, Barbados and the Bahamas. 
Specifically, it analyses the dynamics of commercial 
banks’ lending rate reactions to changes in the central 
bank policy rates of those two countries in the period 
1995-2007 with quarterly frequency; hence, it deals 
with the effectiveness of interest rates in influencing 
the Barbadian and Bahamian economies. In particular, 
it focuses on the following questions. First, does the 
central bank policy rate affect the commercial bank 
lending rate? Second, if so, how large is the short-term 
and long-term interest rate pass-through in each country? 
Third, what is the minimum response time for the central 
bank’s actions to impact on commercial banks’ average 
lending rate? Fourth, how do the two countries compare 
in terms of monetary policy?
As is well documented, central banks’ vital 
influence on money market conditions, and particularly 
on money market interest rates, places them at the heart 
of monetary policy. Changes in money market interest 
rates affect market interest rates with longer maturities 
and retail bank interest rates, albeit to varying degrees. 
Bank decisions regarding the yields paid on their assets 
and liabilities have an impact on the expenditure and 
investment behavior of holders and thus real economic 
activity. In other words, a quicker and fuller pass-through 
of official and market interest rates to retail bank interest 
rates strengthens monetary policy transmission and 
thus may affect price stability. Furthermore, prices set 
by banks influence their margins and therefore bank 
profitability and consequently the soundness of the 
banking system and thus financial stability (De Bondt, 
2005, pp. 37-38). 
This study focuses on the lending rate mainly 
because, among the myriad commercial bank interest 
rates, it is the main channel through which monetary 
policy action is transmitted to the real economy, since 
it serves as an important guide to investment decisions.1 
This view is supported by the work of Borio and Fritz 
(1995, p. 3) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1995, p. 3). For 
instance, the latter study points out that the lending rate 
channel operates when central bank actions affect the 
supply of loans from depository institutions (“banks”) 
and, in turn, the real spending of bank borrowers.
Quite a number of papers have documented various 
degrees of lending rate stickiness (Moazzami, 1999; 
Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; De Bondt, 2005; Kwapil 
and Scharler, 2006). The reasons for interest rate pass-
through variations may be found, among other things, 
in different adjustment costs, the demand elasticity 
of loans, implicit contracts between banks and their 
customers, switching costs and asymmetric information 
costs (see, among others, De Bondt, 2005; Kwapil and 
Scharler, 2006). Put rather differently, the degree of 
lending rate stickiness depends on the extent to which 
(i) commercial banks are able to fully insulate their 
supply of loans in response to changes in reserves; and 
(ii) borrowers are able to insulate their spending from 
alterations in the accessibility of bank loans (Oliner and 
Rudebusch, 1995, p. 3).
At least three considerations justify the present 
study. First, the concern expressed by the Governor 
of the Central Bank of Barbados at the apparent slow 
response of commercial banks’ lending rates to recent 
reductions in the minimum deposit rate (Barbados 
Business Authority, 2008, p. 1) suggests a need for a 
quantitative investigation to shed some light on the 
problem. Second, an understanding of interest rate pass-
through provides useful insight into the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, and should provide 
policymakers with a general idea as to when a particular 
policy action can be expected to have an impact on the 
real economy. Third, a comparative study of countries 
1  The lending rate is one of the determinants of foreign direct investment 
in Barbados, as tested by an error correction model which indicates 
that the weighted average rate on total loans Granger-causes foreign 
direct investment in the period 1995-2005. The relationship between 
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such as Barbados and the Bahamas is more than relevant 
as it may help reveal the effective role of monetary policy 
in similar economies. 
To answer the different questions of the paper, use 
is made of an error correction model derived from a 
partial adjustment model. This popular model is chosen 
purely and simply to see how effective it is in capturing 
the pass-through phenomenon in Barbados. The paper 
makes two contributions to the literature. First, given 
that most studies focus on developed countries, this 
paper, by concentrating on small Caribbean economies, 
adds to the rather sparse body of knowledge on banking 
sector behaviour in developing countries. Second, this 
study is among the very few to compare two small open 
economies with fixed exchange-rate regimes. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly 
introduces the Barbadian and Bahamian economies, with 
emphasis on central bank and commercial bank interest 
rate paths. Section III reviews the literature. Section IV 
focuses on modelling. Section V gives the results and 




The Bahamas and Barbados are islands that share 
similar economic characteristics. Specifically, they 
are both small open economies whose currencies have 
been pegged to the United States dollar at parities of 
BDS$ 2 to US$ 1 (for Barbados) and B$ 1 to US$ 1 
(for the Bahamas). In addition, economic growth in both 
countries is strongly supported by a vibrant tourism 
sector, accounting for about 60% of gross domestic 
product (gdp) in the Bahamas and 15% in Barbados, 
and impressive financial services. 
Commercial banks hold a dominant position in both 
countries’ financial systems. Since they are the main source 
of finance in the economy, the interest rates set by these 
banks strongly impact the investment and consumption 
decisions of individuals and firms and, by extension, 
economic development in these countries. Hence, the 
monetary policy of the central banks of the Bahamas 
and Barbados has, to a large extent, been geared towards 
influencing interest rate developments in the commercial 
banking sector. The following subsections discuss the 
data trends for selected interest rates in both Barbados 
and the Bahamas over the sample period 1995-2007.
1. Barbados
The Central Bank of Barbados currently uses a combination 
of direct and indirect instruments to influence interest 
rates. These include a saving rate floor, a discount rate 
and reserve requirements. The minimum deposit rate 
has served as the main monetary policy tool since the 
1990s, with changes in the discount rate and reserve 
requirements playing a secondary role. Prior to 1991, 
the banking sector was subject to a number of other 
restrictions and regulations, including programmes 
geared towards channelling funds to priority sectors 
of the economy, with stipulations on saving rate floors 
as well as ceilings on weighted average lending rates 
imposed by the Central Bank of Barbados. Accordingly, 
movements in commercial bank interest rates were 
generally governed by the central bank. 
In the early 1990s, macroeconomic developments in 
Barbados were characterized by the turmoil in the global 
economy as a result of the Gulf war and by recessions 
in Barbados’ main tourism source markets, i.e. North 
America and the United Kingdom. The Barbados economy 
experienced a significant fall in real economic activity 
and persistently high current account deficits resulting 
in significant losses in foreign exchange reserves. To 
combat the foreign exchange shortfall, in May 1991 the 
government entered an 18-month stabilization programme 
with the International Monetary Fund, prompting financial 
sector reform. Of particular note, the ceiling on average 
lending rates was removed. 
The financial sector continued to undergo reform 
throughout the 1990s. The Rate of Interest Order was 
revoked in June 1992, the residential mortgage rate 
had been deregulated by September that year and all 
credit caps and controls had been discontinued by May 
1993. Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, there 
were moderate fluctuations in minimum deposit rates 
as monetary policy was geared towards managing the 
level of liquidity in the financial system. Lending rates 
were fairly stable, however (fluctuating around 11%), 
suggesting a rather low pass-through of changes in 
monetary policy to lending rates following liberalization 
of the latter. 
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From 2000 to 2004, the banking sector was 
characterized by high levels of liquidity, a consequence 
of sluggish credit growth. Furthermore, the economy 
slipped into recession in 2001. In an effort to stem excess 
liquidity and spur lending to more-productive sectors, 
the Central Bank of Barbados continuously relaxed 
its policy stance. Between 2000 and 2001, the Bank 
cut its minimum deposit rate four times. Nevertheless, 
commercial banks’ lending rates stagnated. Consequently, 
the central bank once again sought to regulate lending 
rates, instructing commercial banks to set a ceiling on 
the weighted average interest rates charged on loans 
to productive sectors. The indicative weighted average 
lending rate was progressively lowered from a maximum 
of 10% in August 2001 to 8.5% by December, yet lending 
rates remained relatively high even as the central bank 
continued to cut its minimum deposit rate, which reached 
an all-time low of 2.25% in the first quarter of 2004. 
Consequently, the central bank reintroduced loan rate 
ceilings in December 2002, setting the maximum average 
lending rate on selected loans at 8.0%, which quickly 
translated into a fall in lending rates. However, in 2003 
the regulation of loan rates was abolished.
Four years of relatively calm monetary policy 
spurred strong demand for credit throughout 2005 and 
2006, leading to a significant tightening of liquidity 
in the banking system. In response, the central bank 
aggressively raised the minimum deposit rate from 
2.25% at the beginning of 2005 to 5.25% by the end 
of 2006, prompting a general upward trend in lending 
rates. From the fourth quarter of 2006, liquidity began 
to build up in the banking system, largely reflecting 
significant foreign capital inflows and a slowdown in 
credit demand. In an effort to reduce the liquidity build-
up, the central bank eased monetary policy, lowering 
the minimum deposit rate to 4.75% by the end of 2007. 
Commercial banks responded slowly on the whole to 
the actions of the central bank, as changes in lending 
rates were only a fraction of the cumulative changes in 
the minimum deposit rate. 
2. The Bahamas
As in Barbados, Bahamian monetary policy revolves 
around the maintenance of a fixed parity between the 
Bahamian and United States dollars that has existed since 
1973. This fixed parity is maintained in practice by keeping 
external reserves at 50% of the value of total notes and 
coins and demand liabilities of the central bank (Central 
Bank of the Bahamas, 1999). Since its establishment, 
the central bank has used interest rate controls (which 
include ceilings on deposit rates, a discount rate and 
stipulations on prime rates) in association with moral 
suasion to influence domestic interest rates. However, 
high levels of liquidity meant that the deposit interest 
rate ceiling could be removed in April 1994. 
In the latter part of the 1990s, direct credit controls 
and moral suasion emerged as the core instruments of 
monetary policy, with interest rate policy playing a 
secondary role. In fact, there were only two changes 
in the discount rate throughout the sample period, 
associated essentially with shifting bank liquidity and 
domestic credit conditions. 
The most notable characteristic of interest rate 
policy in the Bahamas is the synchronization between 
the discount rate and the prime rate. Indeed, during 
the review period (1995-2007), the difference between 
the prime rate and the central bank rate was 25 basis 
points each quarter. In principle, the commercial banks’ 
prime rate is tied to the central bank discount rate, thus 




The literature on interest rate pass-through is vast. 
Without dismissing the role of commercial bank deposit 
rates,2 this literature review will focus on lending rates. 
2  In the euro area, De Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005) showed that 
deposit rates were by and large a non-predictor of lending rates. 
Methodologically, most studies are of a time series nature 
and use an error correction model as a transformation 
of an autoregressive distributed lag model to study the 
effectiveness of interest rate transmission mechanisms. 
More specifically, the typical study starts implicitly 
with the Cottarelli and Kourelis model (1994) or 
its variants:
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where LRt is the lending rate, DRt is the central bank 
interest rate, ut is the error term and n stands for the 
optimal lag. 
Equation (1) is an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ADL) model of order 1 (n: ADL (1,n)). The impact or 








A generalized error correction model corresponding 
to equation (1) is given by:
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where β0 is the short-run multiplier,







1( )β α∑ ∑
= =
 is the long-run multiplier,
γ is the adjustment coefficient and M = (1- β0)/ γ  is the 
mean adjustment lag whereby the official rate is passed 
on to lending rates. The completeness of the pass-through 
is tested with either β0 =1 or δ =1.
Tables 1-3 contain the empirical results of the 
short-run and long-run pass-through for the euro 
area, the United States and Canada, and other areas, 
respectively. Most authors have used time series with 
monthly data. Note that the magnitudes of multipliers 
are not necessarily comparable, since different time 
periods and data sources are used. 
An examination of these tables reveals that the 
short-term impact of interest rate pass-through is smaller 
than the long-term impact in the majority of cases. 
Put differently, while short-term pass-through is often 
incomplete, long-term pass-through tends to be more 
complete. The implication is that monetary policy seems 
to be potent only in the long run. Short-run impacts are 
larger than long-run impacts in only 3 out of 44 cases, 
making unsustainability of interest rate pass-through an 
issue. Full interest rate pass-through is achieved in the 
short and long runs in an insignificant number of cases; 
full interest rate pass-through that is sustainable in this 
way is of course the ideal.
The only study to use a panel data methodology for 
the euro area is Sorensen and Werner (2006). As expected, 
the study uncovers a high degree of fragmentation in 
the retail banking sector in the euro area. In addition, 
it finds a great variation in interest rate pass-through at 
the country level and reveals a degree of stickiness in 
lending rate reactions to changes in market rates.
Some studies have acknowledged the issue of 
asymmetric interest rate pass-through; that is, the 
possibility of lending rates responding differently 
following an increase or decrease in market interest rates. 
The results are inconclusive, however, in that some authors 
have found asymmetry in interest rate pass-through and 
others have not (see, among others, Mojon, 2000; Borio 
and Fritz, 1995; Acheampong, 2004). 
Where the Bahamas and Barbados are concerned, 
no work has dealt explicitly with the topic to the best 
of our knowledge. However, two papers dealing with 
a related topic are worth mentioning. Moore and 
Craigwell (2002) showed market power to be the leading 
determinant of interest rate pass-through in Barbados 
and the Caribbean. Samuel and Valderama (2006) also 
found that monetary policy was a key determinant in 
this area for Barbados.
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TABLE 1
Euro area: interest rate pass-through by study conducted
Short-term loans to firms Impact Belgium France Germany Euro area





























































































Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the papers cited.
a 2002 version.
TABLE 2
United States and Canada: interest rate pass-through by study conducted 










Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)a 0.41 0.97 0.78 0.93
Moazzami (1999)b 0.34 1.05 0.66 0.95
Short-term loan rates
Moazzami (1999)c 0.42 1.07 0.52 0.80
Kwapil and Scharler (2006) 0.79 0.57
Kaufmann and Scharler (2006) 0.92 1.00
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the papers cited.
a There is no clear-cut information on the duration of loans.
b Three-month Treasury bill rate.
c Overnight rate.
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1. Some theoretical background 
Assume that the commercial banks anticipate some change 
in the central bank’s minimum rate. This expectation is 
most likely to result from conditions in the economy, 
such as the inflation rate or output gaps, that affect the 
central bank’s minimum rate policy. The expectation 
would very probably trigger a change in commercial 
banks’ lending rates or deposit rates, or both. For the 
reasons explained in the introduction, the focus here 
will be on lending rates.
Let LR*t be the desired level of the lending rate 
and DRt the central bank’s minimum rate. The long-run 
relationship between the lending rate and minimum 
deposit rate can then be expressed as follows:
 LR DR et t t
* = + +α β  (3)
where t stands for time and β is the long-run impact of 
changes in the central bank’s minimum rate. The long-
run effects depend on demand elasticity for loans and 
deposits, the degree of market power, switching costs (cost 
of acquiring information, search and administration costs) 
and asymmetric information costs (adverse selection and 
moral hazard) (see, among others, De Bondt, 2005, pp. 
43-45). To make equation (3) operative, the adjustment 
mechanism needs to be spelled out.
2. A partial adjustment model
In equation (3), LR*t – LRt represents the desired change 
of lending rate. One plausible model for this type of 
adjustment is the partial adjustment model, which can 
be expressed as: 
 
LR LR LR LRt t− = −( )λ *1 1− −t t  (4)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is the coefficient of adjustment, 
LRt – LRt-1 represents the actual change in the lending rate 
and LR*t – LRt-1 is the desired lending rate change. 
Equation (4) expresses the actual change in the 
lending rate between t-1 and t as a fraction of the desired 
change over the same period. Note that if λ = 1 then 
the adjustment is instantaneous, while if λ = 0 there 
is no adjustment and no change in the lending rate as 
LRt – LRt-1. A high cost of adjustment implies a low 
adjustment coefficient and, conversely, a low cost of 
adjustment yields a high adjustment coefficient. 
Solving for LR*t in equation (4) yields:
 LR LR LRt t t








Substituting equation (5) into equation (3) yields:
 LR DR LR et t t t= + + − +−αλ βλ ( )1 1λ λ  (6)
where β0 = βλ is the short-run multiplier and β
β
λ
= 0  
is the long-run multiplier. As can be seen, both the 
short-run and long-run impacts depend on adjustment 
cost through the adjustment coefficient. Equation (6) is 
an autoregressive distributed lag model of order (1,0), or 
simply an autoregressive process. Equation (6) is also 
a parsimonious representation of an infinite distributed 
lag model:
TABLE 3 
Selected countries: interest rate pass-through by study conducted
Country Short-term impact Long-term impact
Acheampong (2004) Ghana 0.26 0.55
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) Jamaica 0.15 0.92
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) South Africa 0.61 1.00
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.38 1.48
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of the papers cited.
IV
The interest rate pass-through model
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3. An error correction model 
Equation (6) can alternatively be written, by subtracting 
LRt-1 on both sides, as 
 ∆LR DR LR et t= + −αλ βλ λ λ1t t− +  (8)
where ∆ stands for the first difference operator.
Equation (8) can be rewritten, by adding and 
subtracting βλ DRt-1, as 
 ∆ ∆LR DR LR DR et t t= + − − +αλ βλ λ β λ( )1 1− −t t  (9)
where β0 = βλ is the short-run multiplier, β is the long-run 
multiplier, λ is the coefficient of adjustment,  (1- λ)/ λ 
is the mean adjustment lag and -log(2(1 - λ)) / log(1 - λ) 
is the median lag.
Equation (9) is the error correction model (ecm) 
corresponding to the adl (1.0) captured by equation 
(6). As can be seen, the theory of cointegration is not 
introduced for equation (9), since the error correction 
model precedes the theory of cointegration. Basically, 
if variables are stationary in levels, then both equation 
(6) and equation (9) are valid representations of the 
phenomenon being studied.
4. Method of estimation 
Equation (6) and equation (9) are equivalent, as just 
pointed out. Both are highly non-linear in parameters. 
Hence, some non-linear algorithms are required to estimate 
them. In addition, particular attention must be paid to the 
issue of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
To reprise, the objectives of the model estimation 
are to derive the short-run interest rate pass-through 
(β0 = βλ), the long-run interest rate pass-through (β) 
and the mean lag ((1- λ)/ λ). In addition, for reasons 
explained in Hendry (1995, pp. 216 and 257), a median 
lag is also derived.
V
Empirical results
The data of interest are the following: for Barbados, 
the Central Bank of Barbados minimum deposit rate 
(mdrate), the weighted average rate on total loans 
(watloan) and the weighted average rate on selected 
loans (wasloan); for the Bahamas, the Central Bank 
of the Bahamas rate (brate) and the weighted average 
interest rate on loans and overdrafts of commercial bank 
customers (waverate).
Dealing first with Barbados, the analysis shall start 
by examining the time series properties of these variables 
in the period 1995-2007 with quarterly frequency. 
Figure 1 provides us with the evolution of each series. 
The quarterly mean stands at 4.029%, 11.55% and 
9.87% for mdrate, watloan and wasloan, respectively. 
The median rate is 4.00%, 11.30% and 10.19% for 
mdrate, watloan and wasloan, respectively. There is a 
high degree of synchronization between the series, well 
captured by the significant correlation between them: 
0.659 between mdrate and watloan, 0.791 between 
mdrate and wasloan and 0.945 between watloan and 
wasloan. To study the stationarity or non-stationarity 
of variables, two formal unit root tests are used: the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (adf) test and the Phillips-
Perron (pp) test. The ultimate objective of the tests is to 
rule out any spurious regressions.3 Since both tests are 
in common use, they are not explained here.
Table 4 reveals that all three variables of interest are 
non-stationary at a 5% significance level. Indeed, since 
the adf and pp values are greater than the corresponding 
critical value for each variable in level and smaller than 
the critical value for each variable in first difference, it can 
be concluded that each series is integrated of order 1. 
Since the variables are non-stationary, there is the 
issue of cointegration. In any case, because the adl 
estimation of equation (6) using mdrate and watloan as 
variables yields the same results as the error correction 
model from equation (9), only the ecm results are 
presented. A non-linear least squares estimation method 
(see Eviews software for details on the method) using
3  This pre-testing strategy is by and large abandoned in the framework 
recently initiated by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). 
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Newey-West robust standard errors has been utilized in 
the exercise to deal with the problems of autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity. Table 5 contains the results of the 
error correction model (see equation 9) for watloan.
Before interpreting the main results, it is worth noting 
that while the equation passes the autocorrelation test, as 
the p value associated with the Lagrange multiplier test 
indicates, this is not the case for heteroskedasticity and 
normality. However, the use of robust standard errors 
takes care of heteroskedasticity detected at the 10% 
level. Table 5 indicates that the implied short-run impact 
(elasticity) is 0.104%. With a p value of 0.0077 associated 
with a Wald statistic of 7.105, short-run elasticity is 
statistically different from 0 at the 5% significance 
level. In addition, short-run elasticity is also statistically 
different from 1, with a p value of 0.000 associated with 
FIGURE 1
barbados: evolution of interest rates, January 1995-April 2007 (quarterly data)
(Percentages)
TABLE 4 
adf and pp test results for barbados, January 1995-April 2007
(Quarterly data)
Variable adf (level) pp (level) adf (first difference) pp (first difference)
mdrate -1.747(c) -1.631(c) -5.382(0)* -6.138(0)*
wasloan -1.182(c) -1.262(c) -3.909(0)* -8.616(0)*
watloan -1.884(c) -1.563(c) -4.105(0)* -4.584(0)*
Source: computation results based on data from Economic and Financial Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados, various issues.
Note: adf: augmented Dickey-Fuller t test; pp: Phillips-Perron t test; the null hypothesis for the adf and pp tests is that the data have a unit 
root; (c): with a constant only in the adf and pp equations in level; critical values are: adf and pp with (c): -3.568, -2.921 and -2.599 at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively; (0): with neither a constant nor a time trend in the first difference equations; critical 
values are: -2.612, -1.948 and -1.613 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively; *:significant at the 5% level. 
Source: Economic and Financial Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados.
mdrate: Central bank minimum rate.
wasloan: Weighted average rate on total loans.
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a Wald statistic of 530.575. Basically, there does not 
appear to be full interest rate pass-through in the short 
run. The long-run impact or elasticity is 0.759%. The 
latter value is statistically different from 0. However, 
with a p value of 0.109 associated with a Wald statistic 
of 2.564, long-run elasticity is not statistically different 
from 1. The two results combined indicate that while 
the pass-through impact in the short term appears to be 
non-existent, in the long run it is fully effective. The key 
question is the extent of transmission lag. To ascertain 
this, the mean lag and the median lag are computed. The 
mean lag is 6.314; that is, it takes six quarters on average 
for the effect of minimum interest rate changes to be 
transmitted to lending rates, while 50% of the effect is 
transmitted in just under four quarters (3.715). 
To check whether the results are robust with respect 
to other types of loans, table 6 presents the results with 
selected loan rates. 
Table 6 indicates that while normality is satisfied, this 
is not the case for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
The use of Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and 
autocorrelation-consistent (hac) standard errors takes 
care of the twin problems. The results suggest that the 
short-run impact (elasticity) is 0.247%. With a p value of 
0.0081 associated with a Wald statistic of 7.013, short-run 
elasticity is statistically different from zero. Moreover, 
the short-run impact is also statistically different from 1, 
as indicated by the p value of 0.000 associated with a 
Wald statistic of 65.293. Specifically, it is less than 1, 
i.e. in the short run there is no full interest rate pass-
through effect. The table also indicates that long-run 
elasticity is 1.226%. That value is statistically different 
from 0. With a p value of 0.324 associated with a Wald 
statistic of 0.973, long-run elasticity is not statistically 
different from 1 at the 5% significance level. Summing 
up, the two results combined indicate that interest rate 
pass-through is only fully effective in the long run. The 
mean lag, with a value of 3.965, indicates that on average 
four quarters are needed for the effect of a change in the 
minimum deposit rate to be transmitted to the lending 
rates on selected loans, with 50% of the effect being 
transmitted in just under two quarters. 
As regards the Bahamas, figure 2 shows the central 
bank rate (brate) and the lending rate, which is the 
weighted average interest rate on loans and overdrafts 
(waverate), as decreasing over time. The quarterly mean 
is 5.88% and 11.60% for brate and waverate, respectively. 
The median is 5.75% and 11.76% for brate and waverate, 
respectively. As with Barbados, there is a high degree of 
correlation (0.85) between the two variables. 
Next, the adf and pp tests are used to examine the 
stationarity or non-stationarity of each variable. Table 7 
contains the results of the exercise. 
According to the test values, for the Bahamas brate 
is non-stationary and waverate is stationary. Figure 2 
raises some suspicions about the stationarity of the latter 
TABLE 5 
barbados: error correction results for average total loans, January 1995-April 2007
(Quarterly data)
Dependent variable: ∆watloan  
Method: non-linear least squares
Newey-West hac standard errors and covariance (lag truncation=3)
Parameter Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
α 7.950626 0.699985 11.35829 0.0000
λ 0.136713 0.055639 2.457132 0.0176
β 0.758633 0.150735 5.032896 0.0000
R2 0.164425
DW 2.43497














Source: econometric results based on data from Economic and Financial Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados, various issues.
Note: The model is ∆watloant = αλ + βλmdratet - λ (watloant-1 - βmdratet-1) + λet , where ∆ stands for the first difference operator and 
other variables are defined as above, λ is the coefficient of adjustment, β is the long-term impact and βλ is the short-term impact. No 
observation was dropped.
a Figures between parenthesis correspond to p values.
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TABLE 6
Barbados: error correction results for average selected loans,  
January 1995-April 2007
(Quarterly data)
Dependent variable: ∆wasloan  
Method: non-linear least squares
Newey-West hac standard errors and covariance (lag truncation=3)
Parameter Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
α 4.837868 0.981456 4.929277 0.0000
λ 0.201407 0.075725 2.659700 0.0105
β 1.225545 0.228672 5.359395 0.0000
R2 0.3184
DW 1.0308 














Source: econometric results based on data from Economic and Financial Statistics, Central Bank of Barbados, various issues.
Note: The model is ∆wasloant = αλ + βλmdratet - λ (wasloant-1 - βmdratet-1) + λet , where ∆ stands for the first difference operator and 
other variables are defined as above, λ is the coefficient of adjustment, β is the long-term impact and βλ is the short-term impact. No 
observation was dropped.
a Figures between parenthesis correspond to p values.
FIGURE 2
bahamas: evolution of interest rates, January 1995-April 2007 (quarterly data)
(Percentages)
Source: prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Central Bank of the Bahamas.
Brate: Central bank rate.
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variable, however. Indeed, both the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (kpss) test and the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock 
(ers) test, not presented here, indicate that waverate is 
non-stationary. That result is accepted. 
It is legitimate to examine the relationship between 
the two variables using the error correction model 
(see equation 9). Table 8 contains the results of this 
exercise.
As can be seen, the equation passes the tests of 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and normality. The 
short-run impact or elasticity derived from table 8 is 
1.193%. With a p value of 0.0000 associated with a Wald 
statistic of 18.881, the short-run elasticity is statistically 
different from 0. Short-run elasticity is not statistically 
different from 1, however, as indicated by a p value of 
0.481 associated with a Wald statistic of 0.496, at least at 
the 5% significance level. That is, in the short run there 
is a full interest rate pass-through effect. Table 8 also 
indicates that long-run elasticity is 1.780%. The latter 
value is statistically different from 0. With a p value of 
0.0009 associated with a Wald statistic of 11.025, long-
run elasticity is statistically greater than 1 at the 5% 
significance level. Summing up, the two results combined 
indicate that interest rate pass-through is fully effective 
in the short and long run. The mean lag, with a value of 
0.507, implies that only about half a quarter is needed 
on average for the effect of a change in the central bank 
rate to be transmitted to the lending rate. This may be 
reflective of the high degree of synchronization between 
the policy rate and the lending rate.
Overall, there are three major findings. First, interest 
rate pass-through is fully complete in the long term in 
both countries. Second, while in Barbados it takes four 
to six quarters on average for the actions of the central 
bank to be transmitted to commercial banks, in the 
Bahamas transmission is almost instantaneous (half a 
quarter). Third, if the Central Bank of Barbados wishes 
transmission to be instantaneous, i.e. if it wants to see 
the lending rate increase (decrease) by 100 basis points 
during the quarter in which the change occurs in the 
minimum deposit rate, then the latter must be increased 
(decreased) by between 500 and 730 basis points or so. In 
addition, the reasons for high adjustment costs need to be 
investigated thoroughly. Although such an investigation 
is beyond the scope of this paper, such features as market 
power, switching costs, the demand elasticity of loans and 
asymmetric information costs can be cited as potential 
determinants (Moore and Craigwell, 2002). 
Two issues that could have some impact on the 
results presented above merit some discussion. These 
are omitted variables and asymmetry in the responses 
of commercial banks to positive and negative monetary 
shocks. Since lending rates are theoretically influenced 
by many factors other than the minimum deposit rate (e.g. 
market power, switching costs, the demand elasticity of 
loans and asymmetric information costs), the question 
of interest is whether the model suffers from serious 
omitted variable misspecification.4 Three considerations 
among others can be raised. First, the estimated model (6 
or 9) is a parsimonious model of a more general infinite 
distributed lag model (7) which implicitly captures 
omitted variables through the lagged minimum deposit 
rate variables, since the latter respond to the states of 
the economy over the quarters. Second, the impact of 
most of the so-called missing variables is captured by the 
adjustment coefficient, which is linked to the adjustment 
cost. That is, the adjustment coefficient is a kind of summary 
statistic of all sorts of missing variables. It may therefore 
be inferred that the model very probably does not suffer 
from a serious omitted variable misspecification. Third, 
a formal Ramsey regression equation specification error 
4  A model, being an approximation of a certain reality, will always 
have some degree of misspecification. The question then is how serious 
the misspecification is.
TABLE 7
Bahamas: adf and pp test results, January 1995=April 2007
(Quarterly data)





Brate -2.576(t) -2.675(t)  -7.211(c)* -7.352(c)*
waverate -4.610(t)* -4.658(t) -10.656(c)* -18.972(c)*
Source: computation results based on data from the Central Bank of the Bahamas.
Note: The null hypothesis for the ADF and PP tests is that the data have a unit root; (t): with a constant and a time trend; critical values for 
both tests are: -4.148, -3.500 and -3.174 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively; (c): with a constant; critical values are: 
-3.568, -2.921 and -2.599 at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. *:significant at the 5% level.
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(reset) test for linear regression (lr) seems to confirm 
that there are no omitted variables. This holds true for 
Barbados with a Ramsey reset lr test value of 3.180 
associated with a p value of 0.365, at least for watloan, 
and for the Bahamas with a test value of 4.369 associated 
with a p value of 0.224. 
The asymmetry in responses to positive and negative 
monetary shocks is an important issue. While theoretically 
an asymmetric model is a valid construct, empirically 
it does not necessarily hold true, as pointed out in the 
literature review. This line of research is beyond the 
realm of the present paper. 
TABLE 8 
bahamas: error correction results of equation (9) for loans, January 1995-April 2007
(Quarterly data)
Dependent variable: ∆waverate
Method: non-linear least squares
Newey-West hac standard errors and covariance (lag truncation=3)
Parameter Coefficient Standard error t-statistic Probability 
α 0.993616 1.398494 0.710490 0.4808
λ 0.663163 0.114208 5.806640 0.0000
β 1.799594 0.240816 7.472908 0.0000
R2 0.3333
DW 2.1254














Source: econometric results based on data fromthe Central Bank of the Bahamas.
Note: The model is ∆waveratet = αλ + βλbratet - λ (waveratet-1 - βbratet-1) + λet-1, where ∆ stands for the first difference operator and 
other variables are defined as above, λ is the coefficient of adjustment, β is the long-term impact and βλ is the short-term impact. No 
observation was dropped.
a Figures between parenthesis correspond to p values.
VI
Concluding remarks
Using an error correction model derived from a partial 
adjustment model, this paper empirically investigates 
the effectiveness of central bank interest rate policy as 
an influence on commercial bank behaviour in Barbados 
and the Bahamas for the period January 1995-April 
2007. A less-than-complete reaction on the part of 
commercial banks to changes in the central bank policy 
rate is an impediment to the smooth functioning of the 
financial system. The study finds that, for Barbados, the 
reaction of commercial bank lending rates to changes 
in the central bank minimum rate is sticky in the short 
run but fully complete or effective in the long run. On 
average, it takes about four to six quarters for the full 
effect of changes in the central bank policy rate to be 
transmitted to the economy via adjustments. 
Given the size of the mean adjustment lag for 
Barbados, the question of interest is how to make the 
lending rate fully effective in the short term. According 
to the results of the study, in order to increase (decrease) 
lending rates by 100 basis points, the minimum deposit 
rate must be increased (decreased) by between 500 and 
730 basis points or so. In addition, the reasons for the high 
cost of adjustment must be carefully examined. Market 
power, the demand elasticity of loans, switching costs 
and asymmetric information costs, among others, could 
be the elements to look at when it comes to boosting the 
effectiveness of interest rate policy.
The methods and frequency with which the central 
bank communicates its policy intentions to the public 
may also be a possible determinant of the effectiveness 
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of monetary policy. It has been shown elsewhere (Blinder 
and others, 2008) that the efforts made by central banks 
to communicate do indeed matter when it comes to 
smoothing the transmission of monetary shocks. To 
the extent that more communication helps shape public 
expectations, frequent communication by a central bank 
on the future directions it expects its monetary policy 
action to take should ensure these actions are better 
signalled. 
In the case of the Bahamas, the study finds that the 
reaction of commercial banks’ lending rates to changes 
in the central bank policy rate is fully complete or 
effective in both the short and long run. The presence 
of a lower adjustment cost due to a high speed of 
adjustment combined with the use of moral suasion may 
well go a long way towards explaining why interest rate 
responses are fully complete in the short and long run 
in the Bahamas. 
Overall, this comparative study demonstrates that 
the type of monetary policy applied, in combination with 
other factors, may well explain why similar economies 
might respond differently to monetary policy shocks. 
Indeed, while interest rate controls coupled with moral 
suasion have resulted in full pass-through of interest rates 
in the short term in the Bahamas, this is not the case for 
Barbados with its minimum deposit rate. 
(Original: English)
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